SUGGESTED TITLE: Consequentiality and Contingent Values: An Emerging Paradigm
In recent years a new paradigm has emerged with respect to the concept of "Hypothetical Bias" in contingent valuation. Following Bohm's (1972) seminal public goods experiments, empirical criterion validity tests of contingent valuation have sought to compare hypothetical ("stated") survey responses against the criterion of actual ("revealed") economic commitments to public goods: "Hypothetical bias is said to exist when values that are elicited in a hypothetical context, such as a survey, differ from those elicited in a real context, such as a market" (Harrison and Ruström, 2008, p. 752) . Whereas occasional research has found that hypothetical, stated values can be lower than actual commitments, reviews of hypothetical versus actual public goods contributions (e.g., Murphy and Stevens, 2004; Harrison and Ruström) and meta-analyses of these data suggest "that people tend to overstate their actual willingness to pay in hypothetical situations" (List and Gallet, 2001, p. 241 ; see also Little and Berrens, 2004 and Murphy et al., 2005) . These conclusions translate into what appears to be the conventional wisdom regarding contingent valuation (CV): "A fundamental concern of any CV study is hypothetical bias.
Respondents have a well-established tendency to state willingness to pay values that are significantly greater than those revealed in real-market interactions" (Aadland et al., 2007) .
In a series of conference presentations, working papers, and a journal article, Richard
Carson and Theodore Groves and co-authors (e.g. Carson and Groves et al., 1997 , 1999 ) present an alternative paradigm for conceptualizing the relationship between stated preference survey responses and real economic commitments to private and public goods. To paraphrase Kuhn (1970, p. 81) , in his influential treatise, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, these authors have looked at the same stated preference data, but placed them in a new set of relations with one another by giving them a different framework. Specifically, they argue that the bifurcation of data into purely hypothetical responses and real actions is misplaced and uninformative from an economic perspective. Whereas psychologists have developed theories of hypothetical responses (e.g., Kahneman et al., 1982) , "economic theory has nothing to say about…purely hypothetical questions" (Carson et al., 2004) . Building on the mechanism design literature, economic theory does, however, offer a predictive, theoretical framework for interpreting responses that have the potential to influence agency action.
In this chapter, we summarize the theoretical arguments of Carson and Groves, et al., and assemble early empirical evidence that comports with this theoretical framework. In doing so, we argue that redefining criterion validity in terms of consequentiality offers the potential for a fundamental paradigm shift in the Kuhnian sense. That this shift has yet to be fully incorporated into the contingent valuation literature reflects the nascent state of this paradigmatic challenge as well as the continued inertia of the dominant hypothetical bias paradigm. Further, empirical support for Carson and Groves, et al.' s consequentiality arguments have emerged in a somewhat piecemeal manner, spread across a diverse set of journal articles and unpublished manuscripts,
Consequentiality: Conceptual Framework
In this section we liberally draw from two sets of papers that lay the conceptual foundations of the consequentiality framework to criterion validity in contingent valuations (Carson and Groves et al. 1997 , 1999 and Carson et al., 2004) . The critical component of these is captured in the following comparative definitions.
"Consequential survey questions: If a survey's results are seen by the agent as potentially influencing an agency's actions and the agent cares about the outcomes of those actions, the agent should treat the survey questions as an opportunity to influence those actions. In such a case, standard economic theory applies and the response to the question should be interpretable using mechanism design theory concerning incentive structures.
Inconsequential survey questions:
If a survey's results are not seen as having any influence on an agency's actions or the agent is indifferent to all possible outcomes of the agency's actions, then all possible responses by the agent will be perceived as having the same influence on the agent's welfare. In such a case, economic theory makes no predictions." (Carson and Groves, p. 183) The authors argue that in responding to a consequential survey question "a rational economic agent will take the incentive structure of a consequential survey into account in conjunction with information provided in the survey and beliefs about how that information is likely to be used" (Carson and Groves, p. 204) . Cover letters accompanying surveys typically stress that everyone's response matters, in part to maximize response rates. Survey instruments generally suggest that responses will inform the policy process, and increase realism by, for example, providing reminders of substitute goods and budget constraints. This does not imply that respondents to a consequential survey, however, will necessarily reveal their true preferences. is an open-ended format. Also, even with an incentive-compatible elicitation, if respondent beliefs about the proposed outcome or its cost upon implementation differ from what is stated in the survey, the analyst will not be able to recover the respondent's true preferences without knowledge of these beliefs. In this case, at least theoretically, the elicitation yields a truthful response but to a different proposal.
Foundations: Incentive Compatibility and Demand Revelation of Binary Referendum Questions
The incentive structure used in a survey question is therefore critical to the theoretical formulation and empirical evaluation of consequentiality. When moving from theoretical conceptualizations to empirical explorations, it is useful to distinguish between the theoretical 4 notion of incentive compatibility and the empirical notion of demand revelation. In many presentations these concepts have been used interchangeably (e.g. Cummings et al., 1995; Taylor et al., 2001 ) with the lack of clarity being a source of confusion. Here we are explicit in our
terms. An incentive-compatible mechanism is a theoretical concept, meaning that a respondent has an incentive to truthfully reveal his preferences. Demand revelation is an empirical concept, providing a measure of how well decisions correspond with true, underlying values. If other conditions are not satisfied, it is possible that a theoretically incentive-compatible mechanism is not demand revealing, and vice versa.
Building upon mechanism design theory, most specifically what is referred to as the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem (Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975) , Carson et al. (2004) argue that binary referenda can be incentive compatible under the following conditions. "Proposition 1: A binding (binary) referendum vote with a plurality aggregation rule is incentive compatible in the sense that truthful preference revelation is the dominant strategy when the following additional conditions hold: (a) the vote is coercive in that all members of the population will be forced to follow the conditions of the referendum if the requisite plurality favors its passage and (b) the vote on the referendum does not influence any other offer [that] might be made available to the relevant population." Four recent studies Vossler and McKee, 2006; Burton et al. 2007; Collins and Vossler, 2009) 1 have used induced value laboratory experiments to explore the demand revelation characteristics of referenda that correspond with Carson et al.'s (2004) Proposition 1.
Following Smith (1976) , assuming that individuals abide by the postulate of non-satiation and are otherwise rational, experimental preferences can be achieved in a controlled economic laboratory setting by using a reward structure to induce prescribed monetary value on actions.
1 In the analysis that follows, we use data from Vossler and McKee's dichotomous choice "real, certainty" treatment, Burton et al.' s "consequential" treatment for the three experiments they report on, and the dichotomous choice "plurality" treatment data from Collins and Vossler. The basic idea is that given the opportunity to choose between two alternatives, "identical except that the first yields more of the reward medium (usually currency) than the second, the first will always be chosen (preferred) over the second." (Smith (1976), p. 275) . Building on this idea, the common framework for exploring demand revelation in these experiments is that individuals are offered the opportunity to vote for a public good that will be provided to all individuals in the group if a specified voting threshold is surpassed. "If it passed, each subject in the room would pay $5 (regardless of whether they voted yes or no) and in return, they received 'the good', which was simply the amount of money that would be paid to them at the end of the experiment. If it did not pass, no one paid $5 and no one received the good, regardless of how they voted…They were instructed to vote 'yes' if they would like the referendum to pass, and 'no' if they did not want the referendum to pass." (p. 63)
Participants were informed of their personal induced value and told that not everyone had the same value. They were not however informed of the range of values or how the values were distributed across other participants.
In the Taylor We further note that although there are some systematic differences between empirical and theoretical difference-value distributions, this does not necessarily translate into biased willingness to pay (WTP) distributions. That is, it may be the case that at a 5 The D-statistic corresponding with the K-S goodness of fit test is the absolute value of the maximum difference between the theoretical and empirical distributions. For a large sample, the critical value for this test associated with a 5 percent significance level is approximately n .36 1 , where n is the sample size of the empirical distribution. particular cost amount that 'yes' and 'no' "mis-votes" cancel each other out to a large degree. We turn to an analysis of "aggregate" demand revelation below.
In a similar fashion to our analysis of difference values, we compare empirical and theoretical WTP CDFs using K-S tests for the Vossler and McKee and the Collins and Vossler studies 6,7 . To be clear, these CDFs are constructed from the proportion of "no" responses to each cost amount, rather than the proportion of "no" responses to each difference value. We fail to reject the null hypothesis of equality between empirical and theoretical WTP distributions in both studies.
Taken together, we interpret the results from the above tests as indicative that decisions are consistent with aggregate demand revelation, but there are some deviations from induced preferences at particular dollar values. Most of the deviations from induced preferences occur for small differences between induced value and cost. As mentioned above, uncontrolled social preferences may explain at least some of these decisions.
Demand Revelation in Binary Referendum with Uncertainty in Values
To this point, our discussion has only reported results from demand revelation studies in which the induced values are certain. It has, however, long been recognized (e.g. Opaluch and Segerson, 1989; Dubourg et al., 1994; Ready et al., 1995) Under the assumption that individuals are expected utility maximizers that base their voting decisions on the expected difference value, Figure 2 plots the distribution of "No" responses across expected induced difference values using the methods described above. Using a K-S test, we reject the null hypothesis of equal empirical and theoretical difference-value functions at the 5% level. Note, however, that this rejection is driven by votes made under expected differences of -$0.50 and $0.50, both of which lie within the range of induced uncertainty. Arguably, if respondents invoke decision heuristics other than expected value maximization, it is not valid to assume that these represent errors.
The null hypothesis of equality between the theoretical and empirical distributions cannot be rejected when differences from -$0.50 to $0.50 are excluded. Similar to the above results
with certain values, we do not find any bias between the theoretical and empirical WTP functions. While the evidence regarding uncertain induced values is limited to one study, these results are consistent with the notion that the demand revelation characteristics of the incentive-compatible consequential binary referendum carry over to cases for which induced values are uncertain.
Framed Field Experiments: Homegrown Values and Consequentiality
While induced-value laboratory experiments provide critical information about the demand revelation characteristics of consequential, incentive-compatible value elicitation mechanisms for public goods, contingent valuation is inherently a field method to elicit "homegrown values"
that an individual might have for a nonmarket environmental or public good. "Homegrown value", "refers to a subject's value that is independent of the value which an experimenter might 'induce' (see Vernon L. Smith, 1976 ). The idea is that homegrown values are those that the subject brings to an experiment" (Cummings et al., p. 260) Researchers have used framed field experiments, which differ from a conventional laboratory experiment in a number of ways, to further explore consequentiality. As defined by Harrison and List (2004) laboratory experiments conventionally use a standard participant pool of students, frame the decision abstractly and impose a set of rules. A framed field experiment instead uses a non-standard participant pool with a "field context in either the commodity, task, or information set that the subjects can use" (Harrison and List (2004) , p. 1014). Landry and List (2007) and Carson et al. (2004) undertake a series of framed field experiments using participants from a well functioning marketplace -the floor of a sports card show in Tucson, Arizona. Participants were recruited as they entered the show for a public goods experiment run in a separate room in the same building. The public good is the provision of n identical pieces of sports memorabilia if the majority of n participant votes to fund "Mr. Twister." An excerpt from Landry and List describes the good.
"Welcome to Lister's Referendum. Today you have the opportunity to vote on whether 'Mr. Twister,' this small metal box, will be 'funded.' If 'Mr. Twister' is funded, I will turn the handle and n (the amount of people in the room) ticket stubs dated October 12, 1997, which were issued for the game in which Barry Sanders passed Jim Brown for the number 2 spot in the NFL all-time rushing yardage, will be distributed-one to each participant (illustrate). To fund 'Mr. Twister,' all of you will have to pay $X." (p. 423)
The $X values were $5 and $10 in Landry and List. In the Carson et al. (2004) study, "Mr.
Twister" distributed Kansas City Royal game ticket stubs dated June 14 1996, which were issued for admission to the baseball game in which Cal Ripken Jr. broke the world record for consecutive games played. The cost to each individual of funding "Mr. Twister" was $10.
We report on three treatments here. First, in what we label as the "baseline" treatment the ticket stubs were provided and everyone paid the indicated costs if the majority of the participants voted to fund "Mr. Twister". If 50% or less of the participants voted to fund "Mr.
Twister", no one paid the fee and no one received a ticket stub. The "probabilistic referenda"
was the same as the baseline treatment, with the following exception. If the majority voted to fund "Mr. Twister", then a second step, a coin flip, would be used to determine if the funding decisions would be binding. The funding decision was binding if the coin flip turned up heads, a 50% probability. To impose other probabilities, a 10-sided die was used in Carson et al.(2004) .
If, for example, a 20% chance was being used, and the die turned up one or two, the ticket stubs would be provided and all participants would have to pay the specified amount. If the die turned up a value between three and 10, "Mr Twister" would not be funded. In the "hypothetical" treatment, "passive language was used so that subjects understood that their vote would not induce true economic consequences -i.e. no money would change hands" (Landry and List, p.
423).
Referring back to the consequential/inconsequential definitions, and Proposition 1 above, the baseline treatment and the probabilistic referenda satisfy the conditions for an incentivecompatible elicitation mechanism. However, in contrast with the induced-value laboratory experiments it is not possible to test for demand revelation by comparing induced-value and cost distributions. Instead, with homegrown-value criterion validity studies, a common approach is to use results from an incentive-compatible elicitation as a benchmark from which to compare treatments intended to more closely capture the contingent valuation setting. As a result, the relevant null hypothesis here is simply that each of the probabilistic treatments results in vote proportions that are equal to those in the baseline, binding referenda. In contrast, the hypothetical treatment is inconsequential and hence, we are unable to formulate economic-theoretic expectations of voting patterns vis-à-vis the baseline and probabilistic referenda.
Selected relevant results from these two studies are reported in Table 1 . Examination of the Table suggests that there is little difference in the voting behavior between the baseline treatment and the probabilistic referenda. However, the proportion of 'yes' votes in the hypothetical treatment is considerably higher than the consequential treatments. Statistical tests of the hypotheses confirm that the distribution of voting decisions is equal amongst the consequential treatments, i.e. the null hypothesis of equality cannot be rejected. However, the equality of the voting behavior between the consequential and inconsequential (i.e., hypothetical) treatments can be rejected. Interestingly, the difference in distributions appears to be "knife edged": even low-probability referenda provide similar values as the baseline treatments.
The lesson from these data is best summarized by Landry and List:
"…we find experimental evidence that suggests responses in hypothetical referenda are significantly different from responses in real referenda. This result is in accordance with many of the studies that have examined hypothetical and real statements of value. Yet, we do find evidence that when decisions potentially have financial consequences, subjects behave in a fashion that is consistent with behavior when they have consequences with certainty. Our results furthermore suggest that estimates of the lower bound of mean WTP derived from "consequential" referenda are statistically indistinguishable from estimates of the actual lower bound of WTP." (p. 427)
Advisory Referenda
The framed field test experiments support the hypothesis that as long as decisions can probabilistically influence an outcome, individuals have incentives to respond as if the referenda were binding. This notion of probabilistic referenda, however, deviates from the situation presented in most contingent valuation studies. Rather, "cover letters for SP studies often state that the survey results will be shared with state or local officials….Survey instruments generally provide additional signals that respondents should take seriously the valuation exercise" (Vossler and Evans, forth.) . In this manner, the aspect of potential consequentiality is stressed, but not probabilistically. Rather, the survey responses are presented as being advisory to decision makers. That such efforts by survey researchers are effective is evidenced in a recent contingent valuation study of willingness to vote in favor of a referendum to improve water quality at an Iowa lake by Herriges et al. (forth.) . This survey included a Likert-scale question to measure the respondents' belief about the likelihood that survey results would affect policies related to water quality in Iowa lakes. A "one" response indicated "no effect at all" and a "five" response denoted "definite" effects. Less than 7 percent of those returning a survey reported a value of one, suggested that only a small proportion of respondents regarded the survey as being inconsequential. Carson et al. (2004) address this advisory nature of contingent valuation research in a separate proposition:
"Proposition 2: changing from a binding referendum to an advisory referendum doesn't alter the incentive structure as long as the decision maker is more likely to undertake the referendum proposed outcome if the specified plurality favors it. This proposition follows from noting that it is the nature of the influence on the decision (the agent is potentially pivotal at one point in the decision space, the requisite plurality, with only a binary weight on the in the aggregation rule) not the binding nature of the referendum that matters."
In general, incentive compatibility in the advisory referendum will be based on the respondents' perceived influence on the outcome.
In a homegrown value laboratory experiment, Vossler and Evans used a split sample design to compare responses to binding, advisory and hypothetical referenda. Student participants were asked to vote in a referendum on whether everyone in the group (session) would fund the provision and administration of one on-campus, classroom recycling container at a particular cost. Consistent with Proposition 1(a), the funding mechanism was coercive. In addition, there was no clear venue for which students themselves can purchase recycling containers (and have them maintained by the university), such that the binding and advisory referenda are likely to also satisfy Proposition 1(b).
The binding referendum, as in the prior studies, serves as a baseline for comparison. It involved a referendum with majority-vote implementation rule, which has already been noted to be incentive compatible and demonstrated to be demand revealing in induced-value experiments.
In the advisory referendum, which Vossler and Evens refer to as an "implicit advisory referendum", efforts were made to make the instructions as close as possible to a field contingent valuation survey in which there is no direct signal on exactly how responses will be used in a policy decision. In this treatment, participants were given the following information.
"Passage of the referendum will not solely be determined by how you and the other participants vote. In particular, we, the experiment coordinators, will use your votes as advice on whether or not to pass the referendum. While you will not be told how we came to a decision, know that the likelihood the referendum is passed increases with the number of YES votes cast." (Vossler and Evans, forth.) In actuality, unknown to the participants, the decision rule used was identical to the baseline, i.e.
a majority-rule vote with no experiment coordinator votes. The hypothetical treatment framed a referendum similar to the baseline, but with slightly different language to make clear that the vote was inconsequential.
The results of the three treatments are provided in Figure 3 , which depict the probability of a 'yes' response for costs of $1,$3,$6 and $8. As depicted, the distribution of votes in the hypothetical treatment lies to the right of the other two treatments. Using two-sample K-S tests, the null hypothesis of equal WTP distributions is marginally rejected between the hypothetical and baseline treatment (D=0.231, p < 0.10) and between the hypothetical advisory vote (D=0.231, p < 0.10). The null hypothesis of equality between the baseline and the advisory distributions cannot be rejected (D=0.104, p > 0.10). 8 These results are only suggestive however, as with homegrown values there is no guarantee that the underlying true WTP distribution is the same across treatments. Using parametric models that account for whether the student has a class in the building designated as the location of the proposed recycling container, and socio-economic variables, the authors find that elicited WTP in the hypothetical referendum is statistically different, and is roughly 100% higher, than in the baseline. Yet there is no statistical difference in elicited WTP between baseline and advisory referenda.
Based on their statistical analyses, Vossler and Evans conclude that the results of their experiments "designed to capture key characteristics of a SP survey for a proposed 8 In their paper, Vossler and Evans test whether the overall proportion of 'yes' responses are equal across treatments using Fisher exact tests, which yields stronger evidence of hypothetical bias. "we find support for the equality of WTP distributions among those believing the survey is at least minimally consequential, while those believing the survey will have no effect on policy have statistically different distributions associated with WTP" (Herriges et al., forth.) .
These results are consistent with the "Mr Twister" framed field experiments.
A Contingent Valuation Criterion Validity Test
The last empirical piece of evidence in support of the Carson and Grove's et al.'s theory of consequentiality is a contingent valuation criterion validity test conducted by Johnston (2006) .
This study compares:
"… genuine discrete choice CV responses to aggregated votes in a subsequent, binding public referendum. The assessment is designed to be unambiguous and simple. hypothetical and actual choice contexts are parallel and consequential, and address the provision of an identical quasi-public good (i.e., the provision of public water to the Village of North Scituate, Rhode Island). Respondents are drawn from the same welldefined population. No re-coding or transformation of survey responses is required, no cheap-talk or certainty adjustments are applied, and a ''one vote per survey'' format eliminates the need to adjust for correlation or sequence effects among responses." (p.
470)
The contingent valuation study was conducted to assist the Village committee assess the public support for a public water provision project. The intent was to use survey methods to determine if there should be an officially sanctioned referendum on the project, as required by the State of Rhode Island. Sanctioning, promoting, scheduling and implementation a referenda incurs significant costs. Johnston continues:
"Although the survey instrument noted the possibility of a public vote as a possible subsequent step in the process of establishing the water supply project, this was the first indication that any official referendum might be forthcoming. As the survey was designed as a means to assess public preferences-before the official vote was approved or scheduled-it provides a nearly ideal context in which to assess the validity of hypothetical survey responses in a genuine CV context." (p. 472).
Based on the contingent valuation study, the village decided to pursue a real referendum, wherein the quarterly cost per household was estimated to be $250.
The results from this comparison of an advisory contingent valuation survey and a real vote are consistent with the previously discussed laboratory and field experiments. As depicted in Figure 
Discussion
With few exceptions, conclusions from past criterion validity studies cast contingent valuation in a much different light than studies that focus on other aspects of validity. First, there is strong evidence of construct validity: consistent with consumer demand theory, elicited contingent values vary with factors such as income and scope, and elicited willingness to accept exceeds WTP (see Carson, 1997; Carson et al., 2001) . Second, there is strong evidence of convergent validity: estimates of value from contingent valuation studies approximate those from revealed preference studies (see Carson et al., 1996) . This suggests that, at least for eliciting use values, contingent valuation may be appropriate. Third, there are persistent elicitation effects demonstrating that, consistent with expectations from mechanism design theory, the mechanism used to elicit contingent values matters. In particular open-ended elicitation questions lead to lower estimates of value than doe's dichotomous choice (e.g., Cameron et al., 2002) . These elicitation effects provide further evidence of construct validity.
So then, why is there a divergent conclusion from the majority of criterion validity studies? We hypothesize that reliance on using a purely inconsequential decision setting as the analog to a stated preference survey is at least a partial explanation. there are likely to be a much higher proportion of respondents for which consequentiality does not hold.
Assuming there is a suitable way to separate respondents into consequential and inconsequential camps, researchers are still charged with the task of uncovering the demand of those in the latter group. Cheap talk scripts, alternative elicitation formats and/or calibration methods will continue to be essential in this regard. Justification for continued reliance on these approaches include minimizing possible sample selection bias that may otherwise arise, as well as the maximizing the number of useful surveys collected for a given budget.
We further note that there may be a connection between consequentiality and various aspects of survey design, including the use of cheap talk and language in cover letters. For instance, cheap talk scripts serve to emphasize the importance of obtaining accurate signals of value, and may hence increase the proportion in the consequential camp. On a related note, consequentiality may confound split-sample field survey comparisons if there is uncontrolled correlation between treatment and consequentiality. As such, this is yet one more reason why the development and use of questions to elicit perceptions about consequentiality remain an important area of research.
From the scant number of methodological studies that are grounded in mechanism design theory, it is clear that there is an abundance of additional, fundamental research questions that remain. First, with the exception of Johnston, past research on consequentiality has been comprised of very controlled studies with attributes that differ from the field survey environment, making further field research a priority. Within the laboratory setting the experimental design may be modified to invoke closer correspondence with the field survey setting. Further, given that many researchers, usually out of concern for statistical efficiency or scenario plausibility, continue to use alternatives to the referendum elicitation format, sometimes with a voluntary contributions payment vehicle, exploration of these formats in controlled but consequential decision settings is warranted.
On a final note, there is a very pragmatic reason for redefining criterion validity in terms of consequentiality: we, as stated preference researchers, have been our own worst enemy in the debate over the criterion validity of contingent values. Stated preference researchers who cast surveys as purely inconsequential exercises are providing the impetus to other economists, academics and policy makers to dismiss results from our work. By grounding our work in mechanism design theory we, like many other economists, would have theoretical justification for what we do as well as a framework from which to undertake empirical tests. Pursuing this path will no doubt lead to theoretical refinements that will not only inform stated preference research, but more broadly the economics profession in areas such as decision making under uncertainty and voting. Further, shifting to the consequentiality paradigm should serve to increase the demand for stated preference research in the private and public sectors. 
